purity made simple | micellar water | philosophy

It is well known that after Hegel’s death in 1831, hisfollowers soon split into left, centre and rightfactions over the issue of religion. A dispute over anappropriately Hegelian philosophical attitude to religion had beensparked by the publication in 1835–6 of DavidStrauss’s The Life of Jesus CriticallyExamined—the conservative right claiming thatHegelianism reflected Christian orthodoxy, the left seeing itas a humanistic doctrine concerning the historical emancipation ofmankind. In fact the implications of Hegel’s philosophy forreligious belief had been contentious since his rise to prominence inthe 1820s. While officially declaring that philosophy and religion hadthe same content—God—Hegel claimedthat the conceptual form of philosophy dealt with thisconcept in a more developed way than that which was achievable in theimagistic representational form of religion. Many opponents weresuspicious that the concept of God was emptied of itsproper meaning in the process of Hegel’s philosophicaltranslations and Hegel was suspected by some of pantheism oratheism. Ultimately, then, the source of the corrosive effects ofHegel’s philosophy on religion indeed could appear to be theinsistence that the content of religious belief, like everything else,be grounded on rational, in fact logical,considerations—the logical coherence of the system of philosophyitself—rather than on anything like revelation.

In the Field - Water_Philosophy - Google Sites

This argument is now especially associated with the German philosopher .
Photo provided by

Wright Water Engineers | WWE Philosophy

In an extensive study on these different forms of philosophy, a wide range of people from America, Canada and Europe were asked if they thought the boy in the middle of the picture on the left was happy or sad, they all said "happy." They were then asked if they thought the boy in the middle of the picture on the right was happy or sad, they all said "happy." Then a wide range of people from Asia, including Japan and China, were asked the same questions. When asked if the boy on the left was happy or sad, they all said "happy." When they were asked if the boy on the right was happy or sad, they all said "sad."

Again, Western thinkers focus on one point, the boy in the middle. Eastern thinkers on the other hand focus on the picture as a whole and because the majority of the children in the picture on the right were sad, their answer was "sad," regardless of the smile on the boy in the middle.

The Psychology of the Ancient Hebrews is very different from our own and when we read the Bible we must learn to read it from the Hebrew's perspective rather than our own.

When we use a word like "name," we focus in on how it is written and pronounced.

(Psalm 22:23)

What does it mean to "tell someone about another's name?" Does it mean to tell others how to write or pronounce the name? From a Western perspective yes, but from a Hebraic perspective a name is much more than its pronunciation; it is the character of the individual, his ethics, workmanship, attitude, dependability, resourcefulness, compassion, honor, etc. When the Bible teaches us to "tell others the name of Yahweh," it isn't telling us to teach others how to write or pronounce it correctly; it is telling us to teach Yahweh's character.

Chinese Philosophy of Water - Chinese Women …

Searle's distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is philosophically significant because, Searle argues, the semantics of language can be regarded as a series of systems of constitutive rules and illocutionary acts are acts performed in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules.

This concession, however, posed no radical challenge to the received tradition of Greek philosophy.
Photo provided by

Tai Chi, Surfing, and the Philosophy of Water | HuffPost

Hegel’s Science of Logic is divided into threebooks, dealing with the topics ofbeing, essence, and the concept, which appearedin 1812, 1813, and 1816 respectively. For most of the 20thcentury it was not received with the enthusiasm that often marked thereception of Phenomenology of Spirit. First, as a workof logic most have regarded it as radically outdated andrelying on an Aristotelian approach that was definitively surpassed inthe later nineteenth century—a view promoted especially byBertrand Russell in the early years of the twentieth. Thus manyreaders sympathetic to particular doctrines in Hegel have attempted,contrary to Hegel’s insistence, to quarantine his philosophicalapproach to particular areas from it. Recently, this skepticism hasstarted to change.

Thales of Miletus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

As in the case of Sense-certainty, here in the case of Perception,by following the protagonist consciousness’s efforts to makethis implicit criterion explicit, we see how the criterion generatescontradictions that eventually undermine it as a criterionfor certainty. In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generatedskepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in thework, and there seems something inherently skeptical about suchreflexive cognitive processes. But this is not the type of skepticismthat is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used byDescartes in his attempt to find some foundationof indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built(Forster 1989). As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophyin the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel wasattracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates inhis efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyondthat given immediately in sensation (LHP II: 51), and implicit in theancient form of skepticism that had been employed after Socrates (LHPII: 344). For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skepticalmoment of thought that is the means by which thoughtprogresses beyond the particular categories that have givenrise to contradictions. Just as in the way a new shape ofthought, Perception, had been generated from the internalcontradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, thecollapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence ofsome new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergentattitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape ofconsciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3,is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that,rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, positsunderlying forces involved in the production of theperceptual episode.

The five elements philosophy in Japanese Buddhism, godai (五大, lit

The master replies: It is nothing like ”what is.“Therefore, we can not explain ”no-thought.“ The reason whyI am speaking about it now is because you have asked about it. If youhaven’t asked about it, there is no need to explain it. Supposethat there is a clear, transparent mirror. If it does not face athing, no image is reflected in it. To say that it mirrors an imagemeans that because it faces something, it just mirrors itsimage.