Theory of Knowledge » Theories of Perception

The thing is,tests could be about how much our mental skills have improved, how muchmore knowledge we have stored away, and how much better ourunderstanding of the universe has become, but at present it is not.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: EPISTEMOLOGY …

They are more interested in the increasing theirknowledge than of being thought knowledgeable.
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Theory of Knowledge by Bertrand Russell

To prove the reality of the democratic peace, theorists such as Michael Doyle have sought to show a causal relationship between the independent variable - 'democratic political structures at the unit level' - and the dependant variable - 'the asserted absence of war between democratic states'.

IB Theory of Knowledge - Wikibooks

Memory is the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past. Whatone remembers, though, need not be a past event. It may be a presentfact, such as one's telephone number, or a future event, such as thedate of the next elections. Memory is, of course, fallible. Not everyinstance of taking oneself to remember that p is an instanceof actually remembering that p. We should distinguish,therefore, between remembering that p (which entails the truthof p) and seeming to remember that p (whichdoes not entail the truth of p).

Theory of Knowledge
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Situated Learning - Instructional Design

Suppose an opponent of the ambiguity response were to employ thereplacement objection, claiming that the response focuses on the word‘know’ instead of knowledge itself. This objection would bemisguided. The ambiguity response mentions the word ‘know’only at the initial stage, and then immediately shifts its focus tonon-linguistic entities such as concepts and propositions. So advocatesof the ambiguity response would point out that, when we distinguishbetween versions (i) through (iii), we are concerned with whichpropositions the premises and the conclusion of the BIVargument express, and thus are ultimately concerned with knowledgeitself. The upshot of their reply, then, is to distinguish between thefollowing two propositions:

Learning, Training, and Development Theories and …

Third, if a priori knowledge exists, what is its extent?Empiricists have argued that a priori knowledge islimited to the realm of the analytic, consisting ofpropositions of a somehow inferior status because they are not really"about the world". Propositions of a superior status, which conveygenuine information about world, are labeled synthetic. apriori knowledge of synthetic propositions, empiricists would say,is not possible. Rationalists deny this. They would say that aproposition such as "If a ball is green all over, then it doesn't haveblack spots" is synthetic and knowable a priori.

Learning theory (education) - Wikipedia

A second important issue in epistemology concerns the ultimate source of our knowledge. There are two traditions: , which holds that our knowledge is primarily based in experience, and , which holds that our knowledge is primarily based in reason. Although the modern scientific worldview borrows heavily from empiricism, there are reasons for thinking that a synthesis of the two traditions is more plausible than either of them individually.

Plato and Aristotle: Divergent Theories on Knowledge …

According to an extreme version of naturalistic epistemology, theproject of traditional epistemology, pursued in an a priorifashion from the philosopher's armchair, is completely misguided. The"fruits" of such activity are demonstrably false theories such asfoundationalism, as well as endless and arcane debates in the attemptto tackle questions to which there are no answers. To bring epistemology onthe right path, it must be made a part of the natural sciences andbecome cognitive psychology. The aim of naturalistic epistemology thusunderstood is to replace traditional epistemology with analtogether new and redefined project. According to a moderate versionof naturalistic epistemology, one primary task of epistemology is toidentify how knowledge and justification are anchored in the naturalworld, just as it is the purpose of physics to explain phenomena like heatand cold, or thunder and lightning in terms of properties of thenatural world. The pursuit of this task does not require of itsproponents to replace traditional epistemology. Rather, this moderateapproach accepts the need for cooperation between traditionalconceptual analysis and empirical methods. The former is needed for thepurpose of establishing a conceptual link between knowledge andreliability, the latter for figuring out which cognitive processes arereliable and which are not.[]