Moral relativism is an important topic in metaethics
James Rachels The Challenge Of Cultural Relativism Thesis
It’s always open to the defender of the principle in question to say, “The implications you’ve drawn from my principle are not false.” For example, a cultural relativist could gleefully say, “Sure, I accept the three implications you mentioned.
Cultural Relativism Essay Research Paper The thesis - …
Experimental philosophy is an approach to philosophy that explicitlydraws on experimental knowledge established by the sciences to addressphilosophical questions (see the entry on ). There are three significant ways in whichexperimental philosophy has played an important role in discussions ofmoral relativism. These concern the extent to which there is moraldisagreement or moral diversity among people (that is, DMR),the extent to which folk morality is committed to an objectivist orrelativist understanding of moral judgments (that is, the views ofordinary people concerning MMR), and the extent to whichacceptance of moral relativism affects moral attitudes such astolerance (that is, ways in which views concerning MMRcausally influence whether or not people have tolerant attitudes).
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In addition, it is worth noting that MMR is sometimesjustified by appealing in a significant way to a distinctive analysisof moral judgments in combination with a claim about moraldisagreement. For example, Prinz (2007) argues that what he calls“moral sentimentalism” implies a form of MMR once weacknowledge moral disagreements. According to moral sentimentalism, anaction is morally right (wrong) if and only if some observer of theaction has a sentiment of approbation (disapprobation) concerningit. Prinz defends this position on the basis of a metaethical argumentthat it is the most plausible account in light of empirical studieslinking moral judgments and emotions. Since people often haveconflicting sentiments about the same action, a judgment of the form'Action X is right' may be true (when expressed by a personwho approves of X), and 'X is wrong' may also betrue (when expressed by a person who disapproves of X). Onthis view, the truth of such moral judgments is relative to thesentiments of the persons who make them. Moral sentimentalism is acrucial feature of this argument and many philosophers would deny thatmoral rightness and wrongness depend on our sentiments in thisway. But most arguments for MMR are not based on moralsentimentalism.