Battle of the Sexes | Fox Searchlight
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Battle of the Sexes (2017) - Movie | Moviefone
For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and howwe understand gender shapes how we understand sex (1999, 139). Sexedbodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sexcategories are not picked out on the basis of objective features ofthe world. Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursivelyconstructed: they are the way they are, at least to a substantialextent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they areclassified (for discursive construction, see Haslanger 1995, 99). Sex assignment (calling someone female or male) is normative (Butler 1993, 1). When thedoctor calls a newly born infant a girl or a boy, s/he is not making adescriptive claim, but a normative one. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act (see the entry on ). In effect, the doctor'sutterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage inactivities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two andthat being female or male is an objective feature of the world, ratherthan being a consequence of certain constitutive acts (that is, ratherthan being performative). And this is what Butler means in saying thatphysical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, andthat sex is as socially constructed as gender. She does not deny thatphysical bodies exist. But, she takes our understanding of thisexistence to be a product of social conditioning: socialconditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to usby discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutiveacts. (For a helpful introduction to Butler's views, see Salih2002.)
What was the role of women in Shakespeare's time? | eNotes
The various critiques of the sex/gender distinction have called intoquestion the viability of the category women. Feminism is themovement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how shouldthe category of women be understood if feminists accept the abovearguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharpdistinction between biological sex and social gender is false or (atleast) not useful, and that various features associated with womenplay a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which areindividually necessary and jointly sufficient (like a variety ofsocial roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features andexperiences)? Feminists must be able to address cultural and socialdifferences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinelyinclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that maskimportant ways in which women qua women differ. Theseconcerns (among others) have generated a situation where (as LindaAlcoff puts it) feminists aim to speak and make political demands inthe name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is aunified category of women (2006, 152). If feminist critiques of thecategory women are successful, then what (if anything) bindswomen together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demandscan feminists make on behalf of women?
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