From "Concepts of Determinism," Chapter 3, Section 11, p.

The separation of space-time structures into manifold and metric (orconnection) facilitates mathematical clarity in many ways, but alsoopens up Pandora's box when it comes to determinism. The indeterminismof the Earman and Norton hole argument is only the tip of the iceberg;singularities make up much of the rest of the berg. In general terms,a singularity can be thought of as a “place where things gobad” in one way or another in the space-time model. For example,near the center of a Schwarzschild black hole, curvature increaseswithout bound, and at the center itself it is undefined, which meansthat Einstein's equations cannot be said to hold, which means(arguably) that this point does not exist as a part of the space-timeat all! Some specific examples are clear, but giving a generaldefinition of a singularity, like defining determinism itself in GTR,is a vexed issue (see Earman (1995) for an extended treatment;Callender and Hoefer (2001) gives a brief overview). We will notattempt here to catalog the various definitions and types ofsingularity.

See other uses of the term Compatibility

By manipulating any of such aspects, the effect on the others can be calculated.

The Concept of 'Determinism' in American Literature

In supertasks, one frequently encounters infinite numbers ofparticles, infinite (or unbounded) mass densities, and other dubiousinfinitary phenomena. Coupled with some of the other breakdowns ofdeterminism in CM, one begins to get a sense that most, if not all,breakdowns of determinism rely on some combination of the followingset of (physically) dubious mathematical notions: {infinite space;unbounded velocity; continuity; point-particles; singular fields}. Thetrouble is, it is difficult to imagine any recognizablephysics (much less CM) that eschews everything in the set.

he concluded that the Hopi have an entirely different concept of ..

Any particular example of coping is classified as being primarily adhibitory, inhibitory, or explicatory, but each has the other two strategies represented as either secondary or tertiary, respectively.

There is a family of three - A father, mother, and a 6-year-old child.
He was the first to propose the concept of free will over determinism.

Is Bourdieu's concept of habitus a super determinism

There is certainly an interesting problem area here for theepistemology of determinism, but it must be handled with care. It maywell be true that there are some deterministic dynamical systems that,when viewed properly, display behavior indistinguishable fromthat of a genuinely stochastic process. For example, using thebilliard table above, if one divides its surface into quadrants andlooks at which quadrant the ball is in at 30-second intervals, theresulting sequence is no doubt highly random. But this does not meanthat the same system, when viewed in a different way (perhapsat a higher degree of precision) does not cease to look random andinstead betray its deterministic nature. If we partition our billiardtable into squares 2 centimeters a side and look at which quadrant theball is in at .1 second intervals, the resulting sequence will be farfrom random. And finally, of course, if we simply look at the billiardtable with our eyes, and see it as a billiard table, there isno obvious way at all to maintain that it may be a truly randomprocess rather than a deterministic dynamical system. (See Winnie(1996) for a nice technical and philosophical discussion of theseissues. Winnie explicates Ornstein's and others' results in somedetail, and disputes Suppes' philosophical conclusions.)

After a lot of waiting, you catch another subway and reach the place 2 hours late.

Nominative determinism - Wikipedia

With Frankfurt's account of free will, much hangs on what being ableto will otherwise comes to, and on this Frankfurt is officiallyneutral. (See the related discussion below on ability to dootherwise.) But as he connects moral responsibility only to hisweaker notion of free action, it is fitting to consider its adequacyhere. The central objection that commentators have raised is this:what's so special about higher-order willings or desires? (See inparticular Watson 2003a.) Why suppose that they inevitably reflect mytrue self, as against first-order desires? Frankfurt is explicit thathigher-order desires need not be rooted in a person's moral or evensettled outlook (1982, 89, n.6). So it seems that, in some cases, afirst-order desire may be much more reflective of my true self (more“internal to me,” in Frankfurt's terminology) than a weak,faint desire to be the sort of person who wills differently.

However, if one were to take on the view of a soft determinist then they would not have to change their relationship or opinions of people....

This page discusses a philosophical view on free will

It is tertiarily explicatory insofar as its genesis may be incorrectly attributed by the sufferer, perhaps to the extent of his being quasi-delusionally suspicious of being persecuted by others.