He also wrote about social injustice.

Egalitarians can respond to the anti-egalitarian critique byconceding that it is the nature of some (if certainly far from all)essential norms of morality and justice to be concerned primarily withthe adequate fulfillment of the separate claims of individuals. Howeverwhether a claim can itself be considered suitable can be ascertainedonly by asking whether it can be agreed on by all those affected inhypothetical conditions of freedom and equality. This justificatoryprocedure is all the more needed the less evident — indeed the moreunclear or controversial — it is if what is at stake is actuallysuffering, distress, an objective need. In the view of the constitutiveegalitarians, all the judgments of distributive justice should beapproached relationally by asking which distributive scheme allconcerned parties can universally and reciprocally agree to. Asdescribed at some length in the pertinent section above, manyegalitarians argue that a presumption in favor of equality follows fromthis justification requirement. In the eyes of such egalitarians, thisis all one needs for the justification and determination of theconstitutive value of equality.

FREE Plato: Justice vs. Injustice Essay - ExampleEssays

Socrates attacks these points of Thrasymachus and throws light on the nature of justice.
Photo provided by
Flickr

Justice According to Plato and Aristotle ..

The principle of responsibility provides a central normative vantagepoint for deciding on what grounds one might justify whichinequality. The positive formulation of the responsibility principlerequires an assumption of personal responsibilty (Cf. especiallyDworkin 1981b, contra: Anderson 1999). Unequal shares of social goodsare thus fair if they result from the decisions and intentionalactions of those concerned. Persons are themselves responsible forcertain inequalities that result from their voluntary decisions; andthey deserve no compensation for such inequalities, aside from minimalprovisions in case of dire need (see below). As autonomousindividuals, we all, individually and subsidiarily, bearresponsibility both for the consequences of our actions and forameliorating unequal conditions. This corresponds to the conditions ofour shared life. Inversely, in its negative formulation theresponsibility principle signifies the following: inequalities thatare not the result of self-chosen options are to be rejected asunjust; if a person has this kind of disadvantage, then there must becompensation. What one can do nothing about or is not responsible forcannot constitute a relevant criterion. Still, the initial assumptionremains an ascription of responsibility and each individual caserequires close scrutiny: one is responsible and accountable unlessthere is an adequate reason for being considered otherwise. A processof elimination reveals which individual differences should not justlymatter because they do not result from personalresponsibility. Advantages or disadvantages that are due to arbitraryand unearned differences in social circumstances or natural endowmentsare unfair. Socio-economic advantages and disadvantages that personscan be expected to adopt because they are born into them must beexcluded. Widely shared intuitions of this sort lead to the demand forfair equality of opportunity: people with the same abilities and thesame readiness to use them should have the same chances of success,regardless of their initial social position. But choosing naturalfeatures such as parentage, sex, skin color, height, and indeed innateintelligence as a fundamental basis for distribution is itself unjust:all these features have a discriminatory effect but have not beendeliberatly acquired and cannot be altered by the individual. Thereasons speaking for the exclusion of features like skin color,height, sex and parentage as discriminatory apply equally to othernatural human qualities like intellegence, appearance, physicalstrength, and so forth that are often chosen as criteria fordistribution. The kind and the extent of one's natural abilities aredue to a lottery of nature; considered from a moral standpoint theirdistribution is purely arbitrary (Rawls 1971, 48). For this reason wehave good and readily perceptible reasons for rejecting the use ofsuch features as basic criteria for social distribution. Consequentlyanything for which we are not responsible cannot be considered arelevant ground for unequal distribution; and both natural endowmentand social position are excluded, constituting irrelevant grounds forexeption. Just distribution must be simultaneously insensitive toendowment and sensitive to responsibility. Natural and socialendowment must not count, personal intentions and voluntary decisionsshould count. Thus, a given social order is just when it equalizes asmuch as possible, and in a normatively plausible way, all personaldisadvantages for which the person is not responsible; and when it atthe same time accords individuals the capacity to bear theconsequences of their decisions and actions, in accordance with theircapacity for autonomy. Every advantage that cannot be justified needsto be equalized, as well as every disadvantage not due to personalchoice and responsibility.

How does Socrates define justice and injustice? - Quora

Only some egalitarians hold inequality to be bad per se. Most oftoday's egalitarians are pluralistic, i.e. recognize other valuesbesides equality. Many egalitarians regard the moral significance ofchoice and responsibility as one of the most important other valuesbesides equality. They hold that it is bad - unjust or unfair - forsome to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of theirown (Temkin 1993, 13) and therefore they strive to eliminateinvoluntary disadvantages for which the sufferer cannot be heldresponsible (Cohen 1989, 916).

Before the mid-18th century signs of social unjust would develop and spread too many countries.
Photo provided by
Flickr

Free social injustice papers, essays, and research papers.

In the case of same sex marriages, the factor playing a major role in this social injustice is where most people believe that opposite sexes attract, but in the case of a same sex couple wanting to be married,...

Justice as a Virtue (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Parfit's (1997) priority view calls for focusing on improvingthe situation of society's weaker and poorer members and indeed allthe more urgently the worse off they are, even if they can be lesshelped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishes betweenegalitarianism and prioritarianism. According to prioritarians,benefiting people is more important the worse off the people are. Suchprioritizing will often increase equality but they are two distinctvalues since in an important respect equality is a relational valuewhile priority is not. However, egalitarians and prioritarians sharean important commitment in that both hold that the best possibledistribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. It is just amatter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort of egalitarianismor a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case, entitlement-basednon-egalitarian arguments can result, in practice, in an outcomeequality that is as far-reaching as that sought by egalitariantheories. Hence fulfilling an absolute or non-comparative standard foreveryone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequentlyresults in a certain equality of outcomes that consist in lives thatare not merely decent, but good. Consequently, the debate here centerson the proper justification for this outcome — is it equality orsomething else? — and not so much on the outcome — arepersons or groups more or less equal, according to a chosen metric?Possibly, the difference is even deeper, lying in the conception ofmorality in general, rather than in equality at all.

Plato's The Republic - Justice Arguments

Working against the identification of distributive justice withsimple equality, a basic postulate of virtually all present-dayegalitarians is as follows: human beings are themselves responsible forcertain inequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside fromminimum aid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for suchinequalities. On the other hand, they are due compensation forinequalities that are not the result of self-chosen options. Foregalitarians, the world is morally better when equality of lifeconditions prevail. This is an amorphous ideal demanding furtherclarification. Why is such equality an ideal, and equality of what,precisely?