René Descartes - Wikipedia
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The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes'Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent uponDescartes' theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. Hebelieved that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which theessential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, ofwhich the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes' conceptionof the relation between mind and body was quite different from thatheld in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exactscience of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by theform that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form—you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being outof paper—so the nature of the matter is a necessary conditionfor the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance doesnot follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is adeterminable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thoughtthat he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: aparticular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particularparcel of matter.
David Hume - Information Philosopher
Descartes' conception of a dualism of substances came underattack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult toattach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderateempiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterialsubstances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because herejected all existence outside the mind. In his earlyNotebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterialsubstance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the selfto a collection of the ‘ideas' that constituted its contents. Finally,he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above theideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequateunderstanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts arenot presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we areobliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Humerejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than aconcatenation of its ephemeral contents.