Democratic Values — Liberty, Equality, Justice

This analysis of constraints helps to explain why socialists andegalitarians have tended to claim that the poor in a capitalistsociety are as such unfree, or that they are less free than the rich,whereas libertarians have tended to claim that the poor in acapitalist society are no less free than the rich. Egalitarianstypically (though not always) assume a broader notion thanlibertarians of what counts as a constraint on freedom. Although thisview does not necessarily imply what Berlin would call a positivenotion of freedom, egalitarians often call their own definition apositive one, in order to convey the sense that freedom requires notmerely the absence of certain social relations of prevention but thepresence of abilities, or what Amartya Sen has influentially called‘capabilities’ (Sen 1985, 1988, 1992). (Importantexceptions to this egalitarian tendency to broaden the relevant set ofconstraints include Waldron (1993) and Cohen (2011), who demonstrate,for the sake of argument, that relative poverty is in fact empiricallyinseparable from, and indeed proportional to, the imposition ofphysical barriers by other agents, and Steiner (1994), who grounds aleft-libertarian theory of justice in the idea of an equaldistribution of social freedom.)

Are Liberty and Equality Compatible? // Reviews // …

"To Secure the Blessings of Liberty": Liberty and American Federal Democracy

Are Liberty and Equality Compatible

Parfit's (1997) priority view calls for focusing on improvingthe situation of society's weaker and poorer members and indeed allthe more urgently the worse off they are, even if they can be lesshelped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishes betweenegalitarianism and prioritarianism. According to prioritarians,benefiting people is more important the worse off the people are. Suchprioritizing will often increase equality but they are two distinctvalues since in an important respect equality is a relational valuewhile priority is not. However, egalitarians and prioritarians sharean important commitment in that both hold that the best possibledistribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. It is just amatter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort of egalitarianismor a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case, entitlement-basednon-egalitarian arguments can result, in practice, in an outcomeequality that is as far-reaching as that sought by egalitariantheories. Hence fulfilling an absolute or non-comparative standard foreveryone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequentlyresults in a certain equality of outcomes that consist in lives thatare not merely decent, but good. Consequently, the debate here centerson the proper justification for this outcome — is it equality orsomething else? — and not so much on the outcome — arepersons or groups more or less equal, according to a chosen metric?Possibly, the difference is even deeper, lying in the conception ofmorality in general, rather than in equality at all.

Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American …

From the non-egalitarian vantage point, what is really at stake inhelping those worse off and improving their lot is humanitarianconcern, a desire to alleviate suffering. Such concern isunderstood as non-egalitarian. It is not centered on the differencebetween those better off and those worse off as such (whatever theapplied standard), but on improving the situation of persons in badcircumstances. Their distress constitutes the actual moral reason toact. The wealth of those better off only furnishes a means that hasto be transferred for the sake of mitigating the distress, as long asother, morally negative consequences do not emerge in the process. Thestrength of the impetus for more equality lies in the urgency of theclaims of those worse off, not in the extent of the inequality. Forthis reason, instead of equality the non-egalitarian critics favor oneor another entitlement theory of justice, such as Nozick's(1974) libertarianism (cf. 3.2. above) and Frankfurt's (1987)doctrine of sufficiency, according to which “What isimportant from the moral point of view is not that everyone shouldhave the same but that each should have enough. Ifeveryone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether somehad more than others” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21).

Liberty and equality.
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Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French …

Historical Debates: We have organized some of our material into debates in which important issues such as the divine right of Kings, the balance between liberty and equality, and the impact of population growth were vigorously debated.

LIBERTY! - The American Revolution | PBS

This article is concerned with social and political equality. In itsprescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a loaded and‘highly contested’ concept. On account of its normallypositive connotation, it has a rhetorical power rendering it suitableas a political slogan (Westen 1990). At least since the FrenchRevolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of thebody politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the mostcontroversial of the great social ideals. There is controversyconcerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice andequality (the principles of equality), the material requirements andmeasure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension ofequality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive(liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). Each of these fiveissues will be discussed by turn in the present article.

Fundamental rights in India - Wikipedia

Imagine a society in which everyone was perfectly free to do as he or she pleased. How long would it take for chaos to set in? Order implies a necessary loss of freedom if people are to survive. However, how far can order go? Democratic countries cherish and generally believe that laws should not be ; a little order can be sacrificed in the name of . So one kind of balance is between order and liberty.