The concept of justice differs in every culture
Environmental Justice / Environmental Racism
It is important to distinguish desert-payments from entitlements. Fordesert theorists a well-designed institutional structure will make itso that many of the entitlements people have are deserved. Butentitlements and just deserts are not conceptually the same andregularly come apart. For instance, as Feinberg notes, a person can beentitled to assume the presidential office without deserving it(Feinberg 1970, 86) and a person who accidentally apprehends acriminal may be entitled to a reward but not deserve it. Conversely, ateam may deserve to win the championship prize but not be entitled toit or a person may deserve an economic benefit but not be entitled toit. Indeed, these and many other instances of desert and entitlementscoming apart provide the bases for desert theorists to argue forinstitutional reform. For desert theorists, the institutionalstructure should facilitate people’s economic entitlements(including one’s property holdings) tracking their justdeserts.
Injustice: Gods Among Us - Wikipedia
The distribution of material goods and services is not the onlyeconomic distribution which is important to people. The distributionof opportunities is also important. As noted in the previous section,John Rawls conjoined his Difference Principle with a principle ofequality of opportunity. Endorsement of some form of equality ofopportunity is very prevalent among distributive justice theoristsand, indeed, among the general population, especially when combinedwith some form of market distributive mechanism. Equality ofopportunity is often contrasted favorably with ‘equality ofoutcome’ or strict egalitarianism, by those who believe that wecan show equal concern, respect, or treatment of people without themhaving the same material goods and services, so long as they haveequal economic opportunities. An equality of opportunity principlethen, is combined with other principles to ensure that theinequalities permitted by the overall theory (whether utilitarian,desert, or a Rawlsian difference principle) are only justified ifpeople have the relevant kind of equal opportunity to achieve greateror lesser amounts of goods. So an equality of opportunity principleallows those theorists who depart from strict equality to capture someof what nonetheless has motivated egalitarians. What is the morallybest interpretation of this equality of opportunity principle has beena significant focus of research (see ), particularly among luck egalitarians. In fact, the luck egalitarianideal (also sometimes known as the ‘level playing field’ideal) elevates the role of equal opportunity to the centraldistributive ideal, so that distributive inequalities are only justwhen they flow from one’s choices or from factors for which onecan reasonably be held responsible.