Albert Einstein and politics - Wikiquote
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Autoritätsdusel ist der größte Feind der Wahrheit
Philosophers generally agree that, even if DMR were truewithout qualification, it would not directly follow that MMRis true. In particular, if moral disagreements could be resolvedrationally for the most part, then disagreement-based arguments forMMR would be undermined, and there would be little incentiveto endorse the position. Such resolvability, at least in principle, iswhat moral objectivism would lead us to expect. One of the main pointsof contention between proponents of MMR and their objectivistcritics concerns the possibility of rationally resolving moraldisagreements. It might be thought that the defender of MMRneeds to show conclusively that the moral disagreements identified inDMR cannot be rationally resolved, or again that the moralobjectivist must show conclusively that they can be. Neither is areasonable expectation. Indeed, it is unclear what would count asconclusively arguing for either conclusion. The center of the debateconcerns what plausibly may be expected. Adherents of MMRattempt to show why rational resolution is an unlikely prospect, whiletheir objectivist critics try to show why to a large extent this islikely, or at least not unlikely.
Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth
The second approach to rejecting DMR focuses on theinterpretation of the empirical evidence that purportedly supports thisthesis. Some objections point to obstacles that face any attempt tounderstand human cultures empirically. For example, it may be said thatthe supposed evidence is incomplete or inaccurate because the observersare biased. In support of this, it may be claimed that anthropologistsoften have had preconceptions rooted in disciplinary paradigms orpolitical ideologies that have led them to misrepresent or misinterpretthe empirical data. Or it may be said that even the most objectiveobservers would have difficulty accurately understanding a society'sactual moral values on account of phenomena such as self-deception andweakness of will. These concerns point to substantial issues in themethodology of the social sciences. However, even if they were valid,they would only cast doubt on whether DMR had beenestablished: They would not necessarily give us reason to think it isfalse. Of course, this would be an important objection to someone whoclaims DMR is established or relies on DMR to arguefor MMR.
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