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Though logically distinct, methodological, psychological, andanalytical behaviorisms often are found in one behaviorism. Skinner'sradical behaviorism combines all three forms of behaviorism. Itfollows analytical strictures (at least loosely) in paraphrasingmental terms behaviorally, when or if they cannot be eliminated fromexplanatory discourse. In Verbal Behavior (1957) and elsewhere,Skinner tries to show how mental terms can be given behavioralinterpretations. In About Behaviorism (1974) he says that when mentalterminology cannot be eliminated it can be “translated intobehavior” (p. 18, Skinner brackets the expression with his owndouble quotes).

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 Why would anyone be a behaviorist? There are three main reasons(see also Zuriff 1985).

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Is the case against behaviorism definitive? Decisive? Paul Meehl noteddecades ago that theories in psychology seem to disappear not underthe force of decisive refutation but rather because researchers loseinterest in their theoretical orientations (Meehl 1978). Oneimplication of Meehl's thesis is that a once popular“Ism”, not having been decisively refuted, may restoresome of its former prominence if it mutates or transforms itself so asto incorporate responses to criticisms. What may this mean forbehaviorism? It may mean that some version of the doctrine mightrebound.

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The problem to which Chomsky refers, which is the problem ofbehavioral competence and thus performance outstripping individuallearning histories, goes beyond merely the issue of linguisticbehavior in young children. It appears to be a fundamental fact abouthuman beings that our behavior and behavioral capacities often surpassthe limitations of individual reinforcement histories. Our historyof reinforcement is often too impoverished to determine uniquely whatwe do or how we do it. Much learning, therefore, seems to requirepre-existing or innate representational structures or principledconstraints within which learning occurs. (See also Brewer 1974, butcompare with Bates et al. 1998 and Cowie 1998).

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Elements, however, are elements. Behaviorism is no longer adominating research program.

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Another stumbling block, in the case of analytical behaviorism, is thefact that the behavioral sentences that are intended to offer thebehavioral paraphrases of mental terms almost always use mental termsthemselves (see Chisholm 1957). In the example of my belief that Ihave a 2pm dental appointment, one must also speak of my desire toarrive at 2pm, otherwise the behavior of arriving at 2pm could notcount as believing that I have a 2pm appointment. The term“desire” is a mental term. Critics have charged that wecan never escape from using mental terms in the characterization ofthe meaning of mental terms. This suggests that mental discoursecannot be displaced by behavioral discourse. At least it cannot bedisplaced term-by-term. Perhaps analytical behaviorists need toparaphrase a whole swarm of mental terms at once so as to recognizethe presumption that the attribution of any one such mental termpresupposes the application of others (see Rey 1997, p. 154–5).

More than a decade earlier, in 1966 Carl Hempel had announced his defectionfrom behaviorism:

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Analytical or logical behaviorism is a theory within philosophy aboutthe meaning or semantics of mental terms or concepts. It says that thevery idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a behavioraldisposition or family of behavioral tendencies, evident in how aperson behaves in one situation rather than another. When we attributea belief, for example, to someone, we are not saying that he or she isin a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we arecharacterizing the person in terms of what he or she might do inparticular situations or environmental interactions. Analyticalbehaviorism may be found in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) and thelater work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–51) (if perhaps not withoutcontroversy in interpretation, in Wittgenstein's case). Morerecently, the philosopher-psychologist U. T. Place (1924-2000)advocated a brand of analytical behaviorism restricted to intentionalor representational states of mind, such as beliefs, which Place tookto constitute a type, although not the only type, of mentality (seeGraham and Valentine 2004). Arguably, a version of analytical orlogical behaviorism may also be found in the work of Daniel Dennett onthe ascription of states of consciousness via a method he calls‘heterophenomenology’ (Dennett 2005, pp. 25–56). (See alsoMelser 2004.)

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Skinner charges that since mental activity is a form of behavior(albeit inner), the only non-regressive, non-circular way to explainbehavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral. This non-behavioralsomething is environmental stimuli and an organism's interactionswith, and reinforcement from, the environment.