We might characterize the result as an "immanentalist" phenomenalism.
Immanuel Kant - Friesian School
This is itself a very severe abstraction, based on Kant's view of reason as expressed in the of logic, whose application is supposed to generate the imperatives of .
Kant Immanuel - German Philosopher
However, as is examined in detail in (), the immediacy of intuition that is lost when we consider perception to be the result of active mental synthesis when we realize that this synthesis is an activity that cannot occur in the conscious mind.
GERMAN PHILOSOPHER - The Crossword Solver
This man, whom I name with the deepest gratitude and respect, is Immanuel Kant ; his image rises before me surrounded with pleasing recollections!"
Kant, Immanuel - Enlightenment Revolution
Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real inthe sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they haveeven if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, onthe other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because theirexistence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, wheneverappearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of humanperceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mentalrepresentations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience onlyappearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism onthis interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience tomental representations. All of our experiences – all of ourperceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects andevents themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts andfeelings – fall into the class of appearances that exist in themind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely fromthe reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial andnon-temporal. Yet Kant's theory, on this interpretation, neverthelessrequires that things in themselves exist, because they must transmit tous the sensory data from which we construct appearances. In principlewe cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because ourexperience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearancesconstructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore asort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by thetheory but are not directly verifiable.