then she should apply the principles of virtue ethics to every ..
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Ethical theories and nonhuman animals section - Animal Ethics
The reward of one who does something lies in something being done for him. This is considered by God as ma'at. [Note: Ma'at was the name of the ancient Egyptian social system and also of the principle that forms individuals into communities and that gives their actions meaning and direction by ensuring that good is rewarded and evil punished]
Indirect Duties, Virtue Ethics, and Animals Chapter: ..
This book (arguably) initiated the contemporary discussion of the moral claims of animals and is still essential reading after all these years. In this book, Singer’s utilitarianism is sufficiently submerged to make this a general introduction to thinking about animals in a moral way. Discusses the ethics of eating animals and experimenting on them in lucid and compelling language.
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Animal Rights | Animal Rights | Applied Ethics
The version of contractarianism just examined is, as I have noted, a crude variety, and in fairness to those of a contractarian persuasion, it must be noted that much more refined, subtle, and ingenious varieties are possible. For example, John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, sets forth a version of contractarianism that forces contractors to ignore the accidental features of being a human being -- for example, whether one is white or black, male or female, a genius or of modest intellect. Only by ignoring such features, Rawls believes, can we ensure that the principles of justice that contractors would agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice. Despite the improvement a view such as Rawls's represents over the cruder forms of Contractarianism, it remains deficient: it systematically denies that we have direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice -- young children, for instance, and many mentally retarded humans. And yet it seems reasonably certain that were we to torture a young child or a retarded elder, we would be doing something that wronged him or her, not something that would be wrong if (and only if) other humans with a sense of justice were upset. And since this is true in the case of these humans, we cannot rationally deny the same in the case of animals.
The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics - Hardcover - …
The first I call the cruelty-kindness view. Simply stated, this says that we have a direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel to them. Despite the familiar, reassuring ring of these ideas, I do not believe that this view offers an adequate theory. To make this clearer, consider kindness. A kind person acts from a certain type of motive compassion or concern, for example. And that is a virtue. But there is no guarantee that a kind act is a right act. If I am a generous racist, for example, I will be inclined to act kindly towards members of my own race, favoring their interests above those of others. My kindness would be real and, so far as it goes, good. But I trust it is too obvious to require argument that my kind acts may not be above moral reproach -- may, in fact, be positively wrong because rooted in injustice. So kindness, notwithstanding its status as a virtue to be encouraged, simply will not carry the weight of a theory of right action.